Altruists and envious people who meet in contests are symbionts. They do better than a population of narrowly rational individuals. If there are only altruists and envious individuals, a particular mixture of altruists and envious individuals is evolutionarily stable.
Introduction
Piecemeal evidence suggests that altruism but also envy are widespread phenomena. 1 They refer to the concept that an individual cares about the wellbeing of another individual. Whether the individual is altruistic or envious depends on the sign of this caring. Altruism and envy provide incentives for individuals to deviate from what is sometimes called their narrow self-interest and to do things because they a¤ect the well-being of other individuals.
Consider, for instance, altruism and envy among participants in a contest.
When two players contest for a prize that is allocated to the player who has made the highest e¤ort, they know that their e¤ort also a¤ects the win probability of their opponent. Accordingly, an altruist is less interested in winning, and an envious person may be more interested in winning than a narrowly self-interested individual.
Similar to Bester and Güth (1998) , we distinguish between utility functions that describe an ordering of outcomes according to the individualsz preferences, and their material payo¤s. Utility and material payo¤ are identical for a narrowly self-interested individual (i.e., someone who is free of altruism or envy). They di¤er for altruists and for envious individuals. The distinction between utility and material payo¤ is inspired by sociobiology.
There, material payo¤ determines the reproductive ¤tness of an individual and may di¤er from the individualzs subjective feelings of well-being.
Intuitively, altruistic or envious individuals should achieve a lower expected material payo¤ than individuals who are not altruistic or envious. In this paper we show that an equilibrium exists in which a share of agents is 1 For a broader discussion of the economics of envy and a brief literature survey see, e.g., Mui (1995) . Altruism has been discussed even more widely. Key references are Becker (1974, 1976) , Lindbeck and Weibull (1988) and Bruce and Waldman (1990) . 1 altruistic toward their opponent in a contest, and another share of agents is envious, such that the material payo¤s of both the envious and the altruistic players are strictly higher than in a situation in which emotions like envy and altruism are both absent.
Further, we consider the evolutionary stability of such equilibria. Evolutionary stability of altruism has been considered in the context of private provision of public goods. Bergstrom (1995) and Bergstrom and Stark (1993) consider a particular e¤ect of altruism between siblings that may stabilize altruism. When an individual grows up in a group of siblings, he may do better as an egoist than as an altruist. However, an egoist will have o¤spring that consists of egoists, whereas altruists have o¤spring that consists of altruists. Hence, the o¤spring of altruists will do better as a group than the o¤spring of an egoist. Lohmann, Oechssler and Wärneryd (2001) consider a di¤erent, group-selection argument. Bester and Güth (1998) consider individuals that are matched pairwise and are forced to play some prisonersz dilemma game. Individuals can observe whether their match is an altruist or an egoist. Due to their altruism they treat altruists di¤erently from how they treat narrowly sel¤sh individuals, internalizing part of the mutual bene¤ts of cooperation. They show that this strategic e¤ect is su¢cient to stabilize a population in which individuals are altruists. Their approach is di¤erent, but the result is much in line with Frankzs (1987 Frankzs ( , 1988 analysis of the commitment value of particular emotions like hate, love, or altruism.
Both in the approaches by Frank (1987 Frank ( , 1988 and by Bester and Güth (1998) the assumption is crucial for the evolutionary stability of altruism that the true type of a co-player can be observed, at least with some strictly positive probability. We depart from this assumption and consider a set-up in which a player cannot observe the co-playerzs type. A playerzs own type (envious or altruistic) is strictly private information. The fact that altruism can be evolutionarily stable in this incomplete information framework reveals that a di¤erent mechanism to stabilize altruism is at work. Altruism and envy are optimal behavior given that co-players show the opposite type of behavior. Altruism pays if co-players are envious, and envy pays if co-players are altruists. The relationship between these types has the character of a symbiosis.
In the framework considered here a population with a given mix of envious and altruistic individuals can be invaded by a narrowly sel¤sh population. Accordingly, the result may seem weaker than, for instance, the results in Bester and Güth (1998) . However, the paper also considers much weaker assumptions regarding individualsz information about their co-playersz preferences. Also the emphasis of this paper is di¤erent: the paper reveals an interesting relationship between altruism and envy: symbiosis. We analyse this relationship in an important but speci¤c type of interaction: individuals are randomly matched and enter a pairwise contest: they spend e¤ort to win a prize and the contestantzs win probability is a function of his and his opponentzs e¤ort.
The paper proceeds as follows. First we analyse the contest with two types of contestants and incomplete information. The two types can be interpreted as altruists and as players who are envious about the opponent winning the prize. For this analysis the probability beliefs of the two contestants about their opponentzs type are considered exogenous and symmetric. 3 Then we consider this contest game as the state game in the evolutionary game. We show that, for given degrees of altruism and envy, there is an evolutionarily stable equilibrium share of altruistic and envious players, whereas a population that consists of altruists only (or envious individuals only) can be invaded by envious (altruistic) individuals.
Contests with altruism and envy
Consider the following state game. There is an in¤nitely large set I of players with measure 1, called the population. Individuals from this set are pairwise randomly matched. Matched players (say, 1 and 2) enter a contest. In this contest players make simultaneous contest e¤orts e 1 and e 2 . The player who chooses the higher e¤ort is awarded a prize that has a material value equal to B, which is the same for both players. The prize is allocated according to the ¢ip of a coin in case both players make the same e¤ort, where the e¤orts and the prize are measured in units of a homogenous universal good. The expected amount of this good obtained net of contest e¤ort by player 1 is called the material payo¤ of player 1 and is equal to
3 A few papers that consider contests with incomplete information are Glazer and Hassin (1988) , Amann and Leininger (1996) , and Baye, Kovenock and deVries (1998). 1=2 for e 1 = e 2 0 f or e 1 < e 2 ,
and similarly for player 2 with p 2 = 1 ¡ p 1 . For instance, the material payo¤ could be the playerzs expected income net of contest expenditure. It would also be the payo¤ of a risk-neutral player who is neither envious nor altruistic, but is what is sometimes called narrowly sel¤sh. A di¤erent consideration motivating this de¤nition is that, in a natural environment the material payo¤ is what determines the probability of survival and reproductive success (reproductive ¤tness) of a player.
In addition to the material payo¤ in (1), emotions such as altruism or envy may determine individualsz subjective well-being or utility. Consider player 1 in the contest. If he is an altruist his utility is
with ® 2 (0; 1) and he chooses e¤ort to maximize this utility. The altruist has some pleasure even if his opponent wins the prize. However, this pleasure is only ® times the pleasure he has if the prize is awarded to himself. The constant ® is the altruism-weight and is considered exogenous throughout the paper. This valuation must be distinguished from the material payo¤
(1). The altruistzs utility can be re-written as
Since ®B is a constant with respect to e¤ort choices, an altruist acts as if the prize he can win in the contest is V A and somewhat smaller than B.
Alternatively, player 1 may be envious. He su¤ers if his opponent wins the prize. His utility function is p 1 B ¡ (1 ¡ p 1 )¯B ¡ e 1 with¯2 (0; 1) the weight of envy in the playerzs objective function and can be written as
The term ¡¯B is irrelevant for the playersz e¤ort choices. An envious player acts as if the prize he can win in the contest is somewhat larger than B.
In what follows we assume that players either exhibit altruism or envy, with given parameters ® and¯. We solve for the equilibrium e¤ort choices in contest games in which two players meet. Each player knows whether he is an altruist or an envious person, but does not know the type of his opponent.
However, the share of altruists in the population, and the random matching process are common knowledge. Hence, each player knows that his opponent is an altruist with probability°and envious with probability (1 ¡°). In the contest each player chooses an e¤ort that maximizes his utility, given the playerzs expectations about the other playerzs choice. The equilibrium contest e¤orts are necessarily in mixed strategies and are characterized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Consider a contest with the contest success function (2) with two contestants. A contestant is an altruist with altruism weight ® or is envious with envy weight¯. Each contestant knows his type and knows that the other contestant is a random draw from a population I with a share°o f altruists and a share (1 ¡°) of players exhibiting envy. The cumulative density functions (c.d.f.s) of e¤orts
for altruists and
for envious players constitute the unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
Proof. The contest equilibrium for the case of incomplete information has been characterized in more general terms by Amann and Leininger (1996) for the case of a continuous distribution of types without mass points. The result in Proposition 1 is for a binary distribution of types, but could be derived along similar lines. It is straightforward to verify that (6) and (7) constitute an equilibrium. Suppose player 2 who is an altruist with probability°and envious with probability (1 ¡°) follows these strategies, depending on his type. If player 1 is an altruist, he has utility EU A = ®B for all choices of e¤ort e A 2 [0;°V A ] and lower expected utility for any e A >°V A . If player 1 is envious, he has utility equal to
, and lower utility for all non-negative e¤ort choices outside this interval.
For uniqueness, we only give a heuristic argument that also helps to make this equilibrium outcome more intuitive. It is easy to see that the equilibrium must be in mixed strategies 4 with no mass points other than (possibly) at 4 Suppose the equilibrium were in pure strategies. Let (e ¤ 1 ; e ¤ 2 ) be such an equilibrium. Clearly, e ¤ 1 = e ¤ 2 = 0 is not an equilibrium. Let e ¤ 1 > 0: Then the optimal e¤ort choice of contestant 2 is e 2 (e Consider an altruistzs expected utility from some e¤ort choice:
A marginal increase in his e¤ort choice e A yields no increase in expected utility if
Similarly, an envious person is indi¤erent as regards a marginal increase in his e¤ort choice, e E , if
Equations (8) and (9) are incompatible:
EU E for any given e¤ort level e = e A = e E . Hence, envious players always choose higher e¤ort than altruistic players.
Making use of this result, (8) reduces to F 0 A (e) = . If e 2 = e ¤ 1 + ², then either e 1 = 0 or e 1 = e 2 + ² yields higher utility than e ¤ 1 . 5 Mass points for e > 0 can be ruled out by the following reasoning (Baye, Kovenock and deVries 1996) . Suppose player 2 has a mass point atê > 0. Then any e¤ort e 1 2 [ê;ê ¡ ±] has lower utility for player 1 than, e.g., e 1 =ê + ±, for su¢ciently small postive ±. Accordingly, player 1 never chooses e¤ort from this interval. This in turn makes e 2 =ê suboptimal for player 2. Player 2zs utility is higher, for instance, for e 2 =ê ¡ ±. Therefore, player 2 cannot have a mass point atê in the equilibrium. equilibrium. Note also that, for reasons analogous to the ones that rule out mass points at some e > 0, F 0 A (e) > 0 for e = 0. Further, an altruist must be indi¤erent between bidding D A or 0. If he bids D A he spends e¤ort equal to D A and wins with probability°a prize equal to V A : he wins if the opponent is an altruist, because altruists make bids lower than D A with probability 1, and he loses if the opponent is envious, because envious players make bids higher than D A with probability 1, and°is precisely the probability that the opponent is an altruist. If he bids zero he never wins but has no e¤ort. For given°the material payo¤s can be calculated similarly and are
for envious players.
It is interesting to contrast the payo¤s of the contest game with envious and altruistic players with the payo¤s of the same type of contest if all players behave narrowly sel¤sh and simply maximize their material payo¤s.
Note also that altruism, but not envy is needed to generate positive payo¤s.
6
In this contest, the share of altruists determines whether the material payo¤ of altruists is higher or lower than envious playersz payo¤. In a next step we will assume that populations at a given stage consist of given shares of altruistic and envious players that behave as characterized in Proposition 1. However, the shares of altruists and envious players may be determined endogenously. For instance, if one type of preference systematically yields a higher equilibrium material payo¤ than the other, it seems to be plausible that the share of this type in the population increases. If this process runs for some time, the whole population may consist of one type, and the mutual advantage of altruists and envious players from a heterogenous population may disappear. Alternatively, there may be some kind of predator-prey equilibrium in which a population is stabilized in a situation in which a share of individuals is altruistic and the other share of the population is envious.
This question is addressed in the next section.
6 For complete information (observability of onezs opponentzs type) the material payo¤s in the equilibrium can be calculated using the results of Baye, Kovenock and deVries (1996) on the contest equilibrium for asymmetric valuations of contest prizes. This yields
. Hence, the outcome is qualitatively similar. However, we consider the incomplete information case in order to highlight that it is not the di¤erential treatment that altruists and egoists receive that will stabilize altruism.
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3 The population game
The contest game in section 2 can be seen as a single stage game in a dynamic (evolutionary) context in which the share of altruists is endogenous and changes according to the relative success of envious players compared to altruists, measured by their relative material payo¤s and we can ask the question whether there is a distribution of types that emerges in the long run if the shares grow according to some monotonic evolutionary dynamics.
Note that the zindirectz evolutionary approach is analysed here: individuals behave fully rational given their own preferences, but evolutionary selection operates on the set of feasible preferences that de¤ne the ztypesz, and the ¤tness of a particular preference type is determined by the material payo¤ which this type earns given the population shares of types, and given that each individual of each type behaves fully rationally.
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Consider again the set I with a continuum of players with mass 1 -the population. Suppose the contest game with the equilibrium that is characterized in Proposition 1 is repeatedly played in this population: in each round all players are randomly matched and play a contest as in section 2.
There are two feasible types of players: individuals who have altruist preferences and maximize their expected utility as in (4) in the contest, and envious individuals who maximize (5). Let°t and 1 ¡°t be the population shares of altruists and envious individuals in a given period t: Suppose that typesz growth rates are described by some monotonic evolutionary process where typesz growth rates positively depend on their average period material payo¤s. The following proposition holds:
7 Güth and Yaari (1992) , Bester and Güth (1998) and Huck and Oechssler (1999) and others have used this approach. Some detailed explanations and comparisons to a direct approach in which types are de¤ned by their strategies is in Bester and Güth (1998) .
Proposition 2 There are three stationary distributions of altruists and envious persons if typesz growth rates positively depend on their average material payo¤:°= 0;°= 1 and°=
Starting from some°0 2 (0; 1), only the stationary distribution°¤ is reached in the long run. The material payo¤ of each player in this equilibrium is
The stationarity of°= 0 and°= 1 is obvious. Consider now°¤. The material payo¤ of an altruist is equal to Figure 1 also reveals the comparative static properties of the stationary distribution°¤. A higher weight¯of envy implies a higher evolutionarily stable share of altruists and a higher weight ® of altruism leads to a lower evolutionary stable share of altruists. Further, higher ® 2 (0; 1) and higher 2 (0; 1) lead to higher material payo¤ in the evolutionarily stable equilibrium.
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One can also use the standard concept of ESS to obtain a result that is equivalent to Proposition 2. Samuelson (1997, pp. 41-42 and pp. 63-65) suggests that a distribution°2 [0; 1] of two types with di¤erent preferences is interpreted as a mixed strategy, and then looks for the mixed strategy°t hat is ESS.
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In the particular case here, being an altruist or an envious person are the pure strategies. Using this approach one can use the standard de¤nition of ESS to characterize a mixed strategy°for given parameters ® and¯that is a unique evolutionary stable strategy.
Proposition 2z
Consider the set of mixed strategies that are characterized by the probability°2 [0; 1] of behaving as an altruist, with exogenous weights ® and¯of altruism and envy. The strategy°¤ in (12) is an evolutionarily stable strategy.
For a proof suppose player 2 chooses°. Then by (6) and (7), player 1zs material payo¤ as an altruist is ¼ A =°(B ¡ V A )=2, and his payo¤ as an
For°to be the symmetric equilibrium, player 1 must be indi¤erent with respect to his own choice.
Hence, setting these payo¤s equal and solving for°yields°¤ = V E ¡B VE¡VA
. Suppose a small group of mutants of mass ² invades, playing a mixed strategy°. Therefore, each player expects now to be matched with an altruist with probability ¹°= (1 ¡ ²)°¤ + ²°. In this population the payo¤ of altruists is ¹ ¼ A = ¹°(B ¡ V A )=2. The payo¤ of envious agents is
The strategy°¤ is evolutionarily stable if players choosing°¤ have a higher payo¤ in this population than players choosing°.
That is,°¤¹ ¼
Condition (14) 
Inserting and solving for the stationary solutions reveals that the same stationary solution°¤ emerges.
An important aspect in this analysis was that players are unable to observe their opponentzs type. A type that behaves narrowly sel¤shly (that is, a type with ® =¯= 0) could successfully invade a population with any mixture of altruists and envious individuals. If this type exists, the evolutionarily stable equilibrium consists of this type of rational players only. This negative result is due to the fact that we assume here that individuals cannot observe the type of their opponent, and therefore, the mechanisms that are at work in Bester and Güth (1998) and in Frank (1987 Frank ( , 1988 , or the group selection mechanism outlined in Lohmann, Oechssler and Wärneryd (2001) are not at work here.
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Conclusions
If players are in an environment in which they frequently enter contests with little or no noise (as described by contest success functions as in (2)), they are better o¤ (in terms of their material payo¤ ) in a society in which individuals are either envious or altruistic. The bene¤t of behaving as an altruist is higher the larger the share of envious players, and the bene¤t of being envious is higher the larger the share of players who behaves altruistically.
There is a share of altruists at which altruists and envious players have precisely identical material payo¤s. Populations in which the material payo¤s of altruists and envious players determine the future population shares have a tendency to end up with a speci¤c mix of altruists and envious players.
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